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An investigation into the effect of
surplus free cash flow, corporate
governance and firm size on
earnings predictability
Redhwan Ahmed AL-Dhamari and Ku Nor Izah Ku Ismail
School of Accountancy, UUM College of Business, Universiti Utara Malaysia,
Sintok, Malaysia
Abstract
Purpose – Existing studies on corporate governance mainly focus on how a strong governance
system enhances the valuation of firms with cash holding or free cash flow agency problem. The aims
of this paper are threefold. First, it investigates the impact of surplus free cash flows (SFCF) on
earnings predictability. Second, it investigates whether corporate governance variables moderate the
negative impact of SFCF on earnings predictability. Finally, this study examines whether the ability of
corporate governance to mitigate SFCF and improve the predictive value of earnings varies between
large and small firms.
Design/methodology/approach – This paper uses heteroskedasticity-corrected least square
regressions upon a sample of Malaysian listed firms.
Findings – This paper finds that firms with high SFCF experience less earnings predictability. It also
indicates that earnings of firms with high SFCF are more predictable when institutional investors
hold a large stake of shares and when a chairperson is independent. Finally, this paper reveals that the
role of institutional and managerial ownership in mitigating agency conflict of free cash flow and
improving earnings predictability is more prominent in larger firms. This study implies that investors
still have reservations about the ability of boards to enhance earnings numbers in Malaysia, although
efforts were taken to reform the corporate governance mechanisms following the Asian financial crisis.
Originality/value – This research is considered as the first attempt to examine the relationships
between SFCF, corporate governance, firm size, and earnings predictability in a developing county
such as Malaysia. The findings of this paper serve as a wake-up call to policy makers to evaluate the
importance of governance structure in enhancing earnings predictability in emerging economies.
Keywords Ownership structure, Governance structure, Firm size, Earnings predictability,
Surplus free cash flow
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
The loss of investor confidence in the integrity of accounting numbers following the
financial reporting scandals of various corporations around the world has resulted in a
growing interest in earnings quality among researchers. Earnings predictability, that
is, the extent to which investors can anticipate the future earnings and/or future cash
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flow of a firm based on the current earnings information, is one of the proxies of
earnings quality. Earnings information is said to be of high quality if it enables
investors to analyze a particular firm’s current performance and better estimate its
future prospects (Hussainey, 2009). It is only when the quality of earnings numbers is
high that stock markets rely more on cash flow information when valuing a firm
(Cheng et al., 2013).
In free cash flow agency theory, firms with high free cash flow but low growth
opportunities (hereinafter free cash flow or the surplus free cash flow (SFCF) agency
problem)[1] are more likely to experience a reduction in their value (Jensen, 1986).
A review of the literature indicates that the earnings of firms with high agency costs of
free cash flow are of low quality (Bukit and Iskandar, 2009; Chung et al., 2005; Rahman
and Mohd-Saleh, 2008). In this regard, Jensen (1986) suggests the use of governance tools
to mitigate the conflict in relation to resources under the control of firm managers and
thus enhance the firm’s value. Academic researchers have approached this problem from
different points of view: the corporate governance impact on the free cash flow agency
problem (Richardson, 2006; Wu, 2004); the role of dividends, share repurchase, and/or
debt in reducing the free cash flow agency problem (Gul, 2001; Jaggi and Gul, 1999; Nohel
and Tarhan, 1998; Officer, 2011; Oswald and Young, 2008); and how governance
mechanisms monitor the usage of cash available to managers and improve firm value
(Chen and Chuang, 2009; Chi and Lee, 2010; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Harford et al.,
2008; Kusnadi, 2011; Lee and Lee, 2009). Moreover, the study of Jaggi and Gul (1999)
empirically documents that the conflict between managers and shareholders concerning
excess cash is comparatively severe in large firms.
This study investigates the impact of SFCF on earnings predictability among
Malaysian public listed firms. It also examines the moderating effect of board and
ownership structures on this relationship. Additionally, this study examines whether
the ability of corporate governance to mitigate SFCF and improve the predictive value
of earnings varies between large and small firms. Malaysia provides an interesting
context for this research for several reasons. First, firms in Malaysia are mostly owned
by family members who are involved in the management of the firm and the selection
of board members (Cheung and Chan, 2004; Claessens and Fan, 2002; Thillainathan,
1991). Second, the quality of law enforcement for minority shareholder protection in
Malaysia is relatively weak (La Porta et al., 1998). In addition, the mean cash reserves
of Malaysian firms increased remarkably from 8 percent in 1996 to 12 percent in 2005
(Lee and Lee, 2009). Finally, corporate governance in Malaysia underwent some major
changes in 2007 to strengthen the role of boards and audit committees; Malaysian
firms are required to have an audit committee whose members are non-executives and
at least two-thirds of them should be independent, and moreover, the members should
be financially literate and at least one of them should be a member of an accounting
association or body (Securities Commission, 2007). Also, empirical research concludes
that the Western codes on corporate governance are not applicable in Asian countries,
whose legal, social and culture factors differ greatly from those of Western countries
(Ismail et al., 2009).
We do not include audit committee variables in this study because an audit
committee is considered a sub-committee of the board of directors and hence the ability
of the board to monitor firm managers would consequently be reflected in the audit







































control the behavior of top managers so that they do not behave in a way that may
affect a firm’s wealth (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
This study contributes to the existing body of knowledge on the relationship between
corporate governance, cash holding, and firm value (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007;
Harford et al., 2008; Kusnadi, 2011; Lee and Lee, 2009) by examining how the negative
effect of SFCF on earnings predictability is mitigated by strong boards and an effective
ownership structure. We predict that among firms with high SFCF, those with more
independent boards, smaller boards, and larger share ownership by institutions and
executive managers are likely to report more predictable earnings. Following Jaggi and
Gul (1999), who explore the monitoring effect of debt on free cash flow in large firms, we
extend the study by examining the relationship between corporate governance, SFCF,
and earnings quality in large as well as small firms.
2. Literature review and hypotheses development
2.1 Surplus free cash flow and earnings predictability
Based on free cash flow agency theory, it is evident that when free cash flow increases,
managers will have the incentive to engage in projects that have a negative return
( Jensen, 1986). In this regard, Chung et al. (2005) argue that these projects may support
the self-interest of managers and may offer them a greater level of control over a firm’s
resources. Managers may thus undertake non-optimal actions such as making
value-destroying investments that result in increased agency costs, a reduction of firm
value, and senior executives being pushed into a vulnerable situation. The worst case
scenario is that managers can use opportunistic earnings management tools to inflate
reported earnings for the purpose of obscuring the devastating effect of such
value-destroying investments (Bukit and Iskandar, 2009; Chung et al., 2005; Rahman
and Mohd-Saleh, 2008).
In fact, this type of inflated earnings report prepared by managers may affect the
capability to forecast potential cash flows on the basis of earnings because it creates
fake positive perceptions. In the context of Malaysia, Rahman and Mohd-Saleh (2008)
found that as a result of misleading statements, the stock market gives less credence to
the earnings of firms that have free cash flow agency problems. Since firms with a high
agency conflict in terms of free cash flow are inclined to manipulate and misreport their
earnings information, it is assumed that investors will rely less on this information to
evaluate firms. Thus, the predictive value of earnings would be deteriorated for firms
with a high free cash flow agency problem. Therefore, we hypothesize the following:
H1. Surplus free cash flow is negatively associated with earnings predictability.
2.2 Corporate governance, SFCF, and earnings predictability
There are a number of studies that examine the effectiveness of the role of governance
mechanisms in addressing free cash flow agency problems (Bruch et al., 2000; Bukit
and Iskandar, 2009; Chung et al., 2005; Gul and Tsui, 2001; Oswald and Young, 2008;
Pawlina and Renneboog, 2005; Richardson, 2006; Wu, 2004). Lee and Lee (2009)
conclude that in emerging markets, the negative effects of excess cash and entrenched
managers on firm value is moderated by a strong board structure. Dittmar and
Mahrt-Smith (2007) demonstrate that a high shareholding by public pension funds
would mitigate the non-optimal use of excess cash by managers, and increase a firm’s






































by mutual funds influences managers to disburse free cash among shareholders as
dividends and discourages them from investing in non-optimal investments that would
result in lower returns. In addition, the probability of managers over investing their
firm’s free cash flow is moderated by activist institutional investors (Richardson, 2006).
In the context of audit fees, Gul and Tsui (2001) demonstrate that higher ownership
of shares by directors moderates the positive relationship between free cash flow and
audit fees. Wu (2004) points out that firms with high agency costs of free cash flow
show a greater conflict of interest between owners and managers with respect to excess
cash, and thus it is important for these firms to reduce such costs through the role of
managerial ownership. Pawlina and Renneboog (2005) reveal that a high shareholding
by insiders makes firms less dependent on internally generated cash to finance their
unprofitable investments. Moreover, managers with a high managerial shareholding
are more likely to distribute SFCF through share reacquisition rather than by
squandering them in non-productive endeavors (Oswald and Young, 2008). Therefore,
we expect that governance mechanisms will exert an influence on the negative impact
of SFCF on earnings predictability because the agency problem of free cash flow is
mitigated by a sound system of corporate governance. Thus, we hypothesize that:
H2. Good corporate mechanisms (i.e. independent board of directors, small board,
independent chairman, high institutional ownership, and high managerial
ownership) positively moderate the negative relationship between SFCF and
earnings predictability.
2.3 Impact of board size on the associations among corporate governance, SFCF, and
earnings predictability
From the theoretical point of view, it is argued that the free cash flow agency problem
is evident among large firms and that cash flow-investment spending relationship
varies with firm size. Vogt (1994) argues that large non-growth firms conform more to
the free cash flow agency theory, whereas small-growth firms conform more to the
picking order theory. In practice, large firms are supposed to reduce market control or
prepare for dominance-increasing acquisition sprees through their maintenance of a
significant amount of excess cash (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007). Additionally, in
large firms, managers have the incentives to utilize the available free cash flow to
expand the firm size, which enables them to realize more benefits (Pawlina and
Renneboog, 2005). On the other hand, small firms realize less free cash flow agency
conflicts because of their ability to control the actions of managers thus deterring them
from spending free cash flow unwisely ( Jaggi and Gul, 1999).
From the above discussion, in the case of large firms, the agency costs of free cash flow
are severe and therefore this warrants the use of governance mechanisms that deter
managers from dissipating the resources of a firm unwisely and that, at the same time,
enhance the predictive ability of earnings. This is, in essence, echoed in the study of
Harford et al. (2008), who found that a good corporate governance mechanism is prevalent
in large firms. Therefore, it is expected that the effectiveness of governance mechanisms in
reducing the SFCF agency problem and improving earnings predictability will be higher
in large firms than in small firms. Thus, we hypothesize that:
H3. The positive effect of governance mechanisms on the association of








































3.1 Model specification and estimation
At the organizational level, the ability of investors to estimate future cash flows is
reflected in the predictability of earnings. The estimation of cash flows by investors is
very important when valuing a firm because these cash flows are associated with
perceived earnings quality (Ahmed and Ali, 2013). Velury and Jenkins (2006) found
that the significance of the predictive value of earnings figures is apparent in the use of
accounting numbers in the equity valuation and this requires investors to anticipate
expected future cash flows. Moreover, because the discounted present value of future
cash flows is used by investors to value a particular firm, a strong future cash
flows-current earnings relationship can help investors to assess the value of a firm via
the current earnings numbers (Ye et al., 2010). Using the measurement employed by
Velury and Jenkins (2006), Atwood et al. (2010) and Ye et al. (2010), we measure
earnings predictability by the slope coefficient from a regression of one-year-ahead
operating cash flows (CFOtþ1) on current earnings (EARN). The significant positive
(negative) coefficient on current earnings indicates more (less) predictable earnings.
To examine whether the SFCF agency problem deteriorates the predictive ability of
earnings, we extend the future operating cash flows-current earnings relationship by
adding SFCF to the relation. To control for firm characteristics, we include firm size, debt,
and loss in the model. To ensure that the moderating effect captures only the interactive
effect of governance variables and SFCF, we also include board independence, board size,
board leadership, institutional ownership, and managerial ownership in the model as
control variables. This study interacts SFCF, firm characteristics, and governance
variables with current earnings to test the incremental effect of the variables on the
relationship between one-year-ahead operating cash flows and current earnings. Finally,
a dummy year variable is included in the model to capture the fixed year effect. The
following pooled cross-sectional model is used to test H1:
CFOtþ1 ¼ b0 þ b1EARN þ b2EARN*SFCF þ b327 EARN*CGþ b8EARN*SIZE
þ b9EARN*DEBT þ b10EARN*LOSS þ b11YR þ 1: ðModel 1Þ
CFOtþ1 is cash flow from operations for firm i at year t þ 1 scaled by beginning total
assets. EARN is net income before extraordinary items for firm i at fiscal year t, scaled by
beginning total assets. SFCF is a binary variable with value of 1 if free cash flow (FCF, see
Model 3) is above the sample median for the year and the growth ratio (market to book
value of equity ratio, MBR) is below the sample median for the year, and 0 otherwise. CG
denotes BDIND, BDSIZE, CHIND, IOWN, and MOWN: BDIND is the proportion of
independent directors to total number of directors on the board; BDSIZE is the total
number of directors on the board; CHIND is a binary variable with a value of 1 if the board
chairman is an independent director, and 0 otherwise; IOWN is the proportion of shares
held by the five main institutional investors in Malaysia[2]; and MOWN is the proportion
of the executive directors’ direct ownership of shares to total number of shares issued.
SIZE is the natural log of total assets. DEBT is long-term debt to total assets. LOSS is a
binary variable with value of 1 for loss firms and 0 for other firms. YR is a binary variable,
1 for year 2008 and 0 for year 2009. The * denotes the interactions between the study
variables and 1 is the error term.
In addition, we compute a three-way interaction between current earnings, governance






































SFCF and earnings predictability. Apart from the current earnings-SFCF interaction, we
expect the estimated coefficients on the three-way interaction variables to be significantly
related to one-year-ahead operating cash flows in the predicted direction. The predicted
and significant association implies that firms with high SFCF, strong board structure
(higher proportion of outside directors on the board, smaller board size, and independent
chairman), and effective ownership structure (higher institutional ownership and high
shareholding by executives) report predictable earnings. We use the following pooled
cross-sectional model to test H2:
CFOtþ1 ¼ b0 þ b1EARN þ b2EARN*SFCF þ b327EARN*CG
þ b8212EARN*CG*SFCF þ b13EARN*SIZE þ b14EARN*DEBT
þ b15EARN*LOSS þ b16YR þ 1: ðModel 2Þ
We measure the SFCF agency problem by using operational definitions of the FCF and
growth prospects (MBR) of a firm. Firms with a high FCF but low growth opportunities
are viewed as firms with a SFCF agency problem (Bukit and Iskandar, 2009; Chung et al.,
2005; Rahman and Mohd-Saleh, 2008). Following the literature, the FCF for each firm is
calculated as:
FCFit ¼
INCit 2 TAXit 2 INTEXPit 2 OSDIV it 2 PSDIV it
TAit21
ðModel 3Þ
FCFit is free cash flow of firm i at year t. INCit is operating income before depreciation of
firm i at year t. TAXit is income taxes of firm i at year t. INTEXPit is gross interest expense
on short- and long-term debt of firm i at year t. OSDIVit is the total amount of ordinary
dividends of firm i at year t. PSDIVit is preferred dividends of firm i at year t, and TAit21 is
total book value of assets for firm i at year t 2 1.
Growth prospects are represented by the MBR. This ratio expresses the differences
between a firm’s market and its book value of equity, where the higher the difference
the greater the growth opportunities for the firm (Jaggi and Gul, 1999). Firms with an
above sample median FCF and a below sample median MBR represent those with a
potential SFCF agency problem.
As for H3, we partition the study sample into halves based on firm size to examine
whether the ability of corporate governance to mitigate the negative impact of SFCF
on earnings predictability varies with firm size. Subsequently, we re-estimate Model 2 by
running the regression on the two size groups (large and small firms). We use the
variance inflation factor (VIF) and the Pearson correlation matrix to assess the
multicollinearity problem. Both tests indicate that the multicollinearity problem is not a
major concern. However, the White test rejects the null hypothesis that the variance of
the error terms is homogeneous and free of the heteroskedasticity problem (x2 ¼ 151.251,
p-value ¼ 0.007). Therefore, to address this problem, the heteroskedasticity-corrected
least square is estimated using Gretl software[3].
3.2 Sample selection and descriptive statistics
The sample selection criteria is summarized and presented in Table I, while Table II
shows the distribution of sample firms according to sector classification. The sample
is drawn from all firms listed on the Main Market of Bursa Malaysia. As we aim to test







































in 2008, the two-year period of 2008 and 2009 is covered. Financial data are obtained
from the data stream database, while corporate governance data are extracted from the
annual reports of the sampled firms. Following the literature, finance, insurance,
investment, real estate investment services, and real estate investment trust companies
are excluded. This is because these firms are highly regulated (Bradbury et al., 2006;
Siagian and Tresnaningsih, 2011) and their managers are expected to have less
discretion over the use of free cash flow as well as methods to cover the bad performance
of earnings (Rahman and Mohd-Saleh, 2008). To increase the homogeneity of the sample,
companies whose financial year ends on dates other than December 31 are also excluded.
This study requires data for the years 2007 and 2010 in addition to those for 2008 and
2009 to represent earnings predictability and free cash flow. Therefore, firms newly
listed during the four years (2007 through 2010) which may bias our results are
eliminated. Moreover, we omit companies with incomplete financial and corporate
governance data for the sample period. We transform variables with extreme values
using normal scores and logarithms to reduce the possible influence of outliers on the
estimate of the coefficients.
Based on the size of the firms (large and small), Table III shows the descriptive
statistics and mean differences for the variables under investigation. The univariate
comparisons suggest that large firms generate more earnings than small firms, which
is evident from the higher mean value of EARN. The differences in the mean value of
EARN between large and small firms are statistically significant at the 0.01 level of




Companies listed on the Main Market of Bursa Malaysia at December 31, 2010 1,750
Less finance, insurance, investment, real estate investment services, and real estate
investment trust companies (228)
Companies with other than December 31 fiscal year end (672)
Newly listed companies (90)
Companies with insufficient financial data (50)




Industry No. of companies Percentage (%)
Consumer products 120 18.2

















































(lower) than those of small firms and all are significant at the 0.01 level of confidence.
These findings indicate that large firms tend to have larger boards and substantial
shareholdings by institutional investors. The results also indicate that firms that have
executive directors with higher interests tend to be lower in size. Collectively, the
findings indicate that small firms may be family-owned, and therefore, institutional
investors are less likely to invest in small firms than large firms.
In line with Gul (2001) and Jaggi and Gul (1999), large firms have more debt in their
capital structure than small firms (the mean difference is statistically significant at the
0.01 level of confidence). This result implies that large firms use more debts as external
financing to reduce the agency costs of SFCF. However, contrary to our expectation,
large firms are less likely to experience agency conflict with respect to SFCF than small
firms. Compared to small firms, large firms are more profitable. In conclusion, the
above discussion indicates that large and small firms have different characteristics,
and this therefore underscores the importance of considering the factors at play when
testing our hypotheses. Table IV shows the correlation among the variables under
investigation.
4. Results
Table V shows the findings with respect to the association between SFCF and earnings
quality and for the moderating effect of corporate governance practices on this
relationship. As shown in the table, the stand-alone coefficient on EARN is positively
significant in the two models at p , 0.01, implying that Malaysian investors do make
use of reported earnings to anticipate future cash flows. The coefficient of 0.548
indicates that a 1 percent change in current earnings results in a 0.548 change in future
cash flows. Consistent with our expectation, SFCF is negatively and significantly
related to earnings predictability. This means that the predictive value of earnings
decreases by approximately 20.245 for each point increase in the SFCF. The result is
in line with those of prior studies which found that firms with high SFCF experience
low-quality earnings numbers (Bukit and Iskandar, 2009; Chung et al., 2005; Rahman
and Mohd-Saleh, 2008). Among the governance variables, only board leadership has an
influence on earnings predictability in the predicted direction. This implies that
firms with an independent chairman experience more predictable earnings. We also
Large firms Small firms
Max. Min. Mean Max. Min. Mean Difference p-value
CFOitþ1 0.546 20.662 0.072 0.484 20.388 0.062 0.01 0.231
EARN 0.351 20.294 0.049 0.390 20.475 0.019 0.03 0.000 * *
BDIND 0.857 0.250 0.439 0.800 0.166 0.439 0.00 0.963
BDSIZE 15 4 8.05 17 4 7.07 0.98 0.000 * *
CHIND – – 0.34 – – 0.33 0.01 0.719
IOWN 0.745 0.000 0.068 0.294 0.000 0.023 0.045 0.000 * *
MOWN 0.969 0.000 0.046 0.744 0.000 0.124 20.078 0.000 * *
SFCF – – 0.22 – – 0.29 20.07 0.036 *
DEBT 0.709 0.000 0.126 0.590 0.000 0.070 0.056 0.000 * *
LOSS – – 0.14 – – 0.31 20.17 0.000 * *






debt, loss, and SFCF



















































































































































































































































































































































































































find that the earnings of large firms and loss firms are less predictable because the
managers of these firms are more likely to manipulate earnings to avoid government
intervention and the publication of negative earnings (Sweeney, 1994; Watts and
Zimmerman, 1978).
Model 2 tests the interaction of corporate governance and SFCF on earnings
predictability. As shown in the model, EARN*SFCF*BDSIZE is marginally associated
with earnings predictability, and the relationship is in the opposite direction. This
result suggests that firms with small boards are less likely to mitigate the agency
conflict with respect to SFCF and enhance earnings predictability. Even though
the coefficient of EARN*SFCF*CHIND is positive, it is significant only at the 0.10 level
of confidence. On the other hand, the coefficient of EARN*SFCF*BDIND is not
significant. A possible explanation for the findings is that as the board of directors
becomes larger and less independent, investors may perceive the board to be less
CFOtþ1 ¼ b0 þ b1EARN þ b2EARN*SFCF þ b327EARN*CGþ b8212 þ EARN*CG*SFCF
þ b13EARN*SIZE þ b14EARN*DEBT þ b15EARN*LOSS þ b16YR þ 1:




sign Model 1 Model 2 VIF
const ? 20.193 (23.973) * * * 20.190 (23.763) * * *
EARN þ 0.548 (8.435) * * * 0.575 (8.387) * * * 3.727
EARN*SFCF 2 20.245 (22.024) * * 20.230 (21.996) * * 1.922
EARN*SFCF*BDIND þ 20.015 (20.133) 1.426
EARN*SFCF*BDSIZE 2 0.179 (1.732) * 1.293
EARN*SFCF*CHIND þ 0.408 (1.759) * 2.167
EARN*SFCF*IOWN þ 0.392 (2.497) * * 1.275
EARN*SFCF*MOWN þ 0.099 (0.810) 1.269
EARN*BDIND þ 20.034 (21.118) 20.055 (21.438) 1.320
EARN*BDSIZE 2 20.036 (20.949) 20.042 (20.951) 1.564
EARN*CHIND þ 0.131 (1.940) * 0.088 (1.131) 2.066
EARN*IOWN þ 0.050 (1.296) 0.023 (0.509) 1.537
EARN*MOWN þ 20.007 (20.202) 20.029 (20.744) 1.477
EPS*SIZE 2 20.077 (21.761) * 20.078 (21.675) * 1.907
EPS*DEBT 2 20.038 (21.333) 20.048 (21.531) 1.176
EPS*LOSS 2 20.227 (22.670) * * * 20.214 (22.340) * * 2.980
YR ? 0.306 (4.900) * * * 0.306 (4.952) * * * 1.013
Adjusted R 2 0.325 0.298
F-statistic 29.808 * * * 18.462 * * *
F test x2 ( p-value) 18.851 (0.002)
Notes: Significant at: *0.10, * *0.05 and * * *0.01 levels; CFOitþ1 – one-year-ahead operating cash
flows scaled by beginning total assets; EARN – current earnings scaled by beginning total assets;
BDIND – proportion of independent non-executive directors on the board; BDSIZE – total number of
directors on the board; CHIND – chairman independence; IOWN – the proportion of shares held by the
five main institutional investors in Malaysia; SIZE – total assets; DEBT – debt to total assets ratio;
LOSS – loss firm; YR – fixed year effects; T-statistics are in parentheses, while standard betas are
outside parentheses; Z scores of variables SIZE and BDIND are used to mitigate multicollinearity
problem; normal scores are used to transform EARN, IOWN, MOWN, and DEBT while variables
BDSIZE and SIZE are transformed using logarithm
Table V.
Regression results for the
influence of SFCF, firm
characteristics, corporate
governance, and the









































effective in preventing earnings misstatements by managers who want to hide the
negative impact of value-destroying projects.
However, EARN*SFCF*IOWN is positively and significantly related to earnings
predictability at the 0.05 level of confidence. This finding suggests that firms with high
SFCF are more likely to experience predictable earnings if institutional ownership is
high. The result supports those of previous studies that found that the monitoring role of
institutional investors is effective in reducing the agency costs of free cash flow
(Bruch et al., 2000; Chen and Chuang, 2009; Chi and Lee, 2010; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith,
2007; Richardson, 2006). The coefficient of EARN*SFCF*MOWN is in the predicted
direction, but statistically insignificant. Overall, the F-test rejects the null hypothesis that
the regression parameters for the three-way interaction variables are equal to zero,
lending support to our expectation that the negative impact of SFCF on earnings
predictability will be moderated by effective corporate governance mechanisms.
Table VI shows the results of the test that sought to ascertain whether the ability of
governance practices to mitigate the negative impact of SFCF on earnings predictability
depends on firm size. As shown in the table, none of the board structure variables
reduces the agency costs of SFCF in both groups (large and small). Rather, a negative
and significant coefficient of EARN*SFCF*BDIND is found in the small firms group.
These findings suggest that such boards would be less inclined to prevent managers
(controlling shareholders in the Malaysian context) from squandering a firm’s resources
in negative-return investments. If this were the case, the result would be a decrease in the
valuation of a firm and eventually its earnings quality. These findings are inconsistent
with prior research that found that board structure plays an effective role in mitigating
the agency problem of free cash flow and enhancing firm value (Lasfer, 2002; Lee and
Lee, 2009).
Large firms Small firms
Explanatory variables N ¼ 325 N ¼ 335
(Constant) 20.182 (22.486) * * 20.281 (23.912) * *
EARN 0.687 (6.323) * * * 0.600 (5.563) * * *
EARN*SFCF 20.173 (20.988) 20.468 (22.883) * * *
EARN*SFCF*BDIND 0.304 (1.506) 20.200 (21.811) *
EARN*SFCF*BDSIZE 0.124 (0.811) 20.038 (20.429)
EARN*SFCF*CHIND 0.459 (1.212) 0.150 (0.684)
EARN*SFCF*IOWN 0.707 (2.948) * * * 20.056 (20.440)
EARN*SFCF*MOWN 0.331 (3.057) * * * 0.087 (0.692)
EARN*BDIND 20.085 (21.267) 20.010 (20.219)
EARN*BDSIZE 0.002 (0.026) 20.058 (21.338)
EARN*CHIND 0.087 (0.661) 0.004 (0.051)
EARN*IOWN 20.210 (23.096) * * * 0.125 (1.993) * *
EARN*MOWN 20.117 (21.507) 20.017 (20.420)
EARN*DEBT 20.041 (20.726) 20.099 (22.540) * *
EARN*LOSS 20.425 (22.886) * * * 20.155 (21.211)
YR 0.216 (2.562) * * 0.479 (5.749) * * *
Adjusted R 2 0.276 0.388
F-statistic 9.232 * * * 15.142 * * *





















































The results in Table VI indicate that even though EARN*SFCF*IOWN and
EARN*SFCF*MOWN have no significant impact on earnings predictability in small
firms, they are positive and significant at the 0.01 level of confidence in large firms.
These findings suggest that in larger firms, earnings are more predictable for firms
with high SFCF when shareholding by institutions and executive directors is high. The
results also support our expectation that the moderating role of institutional and
managerial ownership on the relationship between SFCF and earnings quality will be
more pronounced in large firms than small firms.
5. Robustness analysis
Three additional tests are performed to ensure the sensitivity and robustness of the
main results discussed earlier[4]. The first additional test re-runs our models using
ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with robust standard errors to overcome the
heteroskedasticity problem. The unreported results for the OLS regressions are
approximately the same as those for the heteroskedasticity-corrected least square
regressions except that the coefficient of EARN*SFCF*CHIND is no longer statistically
significant. Furthermore, in the main analysis, we delete observations related to the
entry of new firms during the sample period (of 2008 and 2009) as well as 2007 and
2010. To ensure that this restriction does not affect our results, we add back the
observations to the sample and repeat the analysis. The unreported results for the new
sample do not differ much from those for the sample without data on newly listed
firms. Finally, we develop a board of directors index (BDI) through aggregating the
scores of the board mechanisms investigated in this study[5]. This is because we want
to examine whether the index can better capture the actual capability of the board
mechanisms to improve earnings predictability through reducing the agency costs of
free cash flow (Chen and Rezaee, 2012). Table VII shows the incorporated mechanisms
and scores attached to them.
The BDI ranges from zero to three. A higher index score indicates a more effective board
of directors, with a BDI score of three being the highest. We re-run this study’s models using
the new variable (BDI) instead of individual measures of the board of directors (i.e. board
independence, board size, and board leadership). The unreported results lend further
support to the ability of institutional investors and executive directors with high
shareholding to attenuate the negative impact of SFCF on the predictability of reported
earnings in large firms. Interestingly, the results also indicate that the role of BDI in
restraining managers in firms with a high free cash flow agency problem from
deteriorating earnings predictability is more pronounced in large firms than in small firms.
6. Conclusion
The findings of existing studies on financial reporting quality show that SFCF
deteriorates the reliability and value relevance of reported earnings numbers (Bukit
Items Score
BDIND 1 for firms with above sample median BDIND for the year, and 0 otherwise
BDSIZE 1 for firms with below sample median BDSIZE for the year, and 0 otherwise









































and Iskandar, 2009; Chung et al., 2005; Rahman and Mohd-Saleh, 2008). Here, we went
one step further by investigating the relationships between SFCF, corporate governance,
and earnings predictability. We also explored whether the ability of governance
mechanisms to reduce the negative impact of SFCF on earnings predictability is a
function of firm size. The results have several interesting theoretical and practical
implications. First, earnings are less predictable for firms with high SFCF. Second, while
investors value the effective role of institutional and managerial ownership in reducing
the agency costs of free cash flow and improving the predictive value of earnings
numbers, they give less credence to the earnings numbers published by firms with a
strong board structure when SFCF is high. Probably this is due to the nature of the board
structure in East Asian countries, where board independence is exists in “form” but not
“substance” (Connelly et al., 2012). In addition, management intervention in selecting
directors from outside, lack of knowledge on the firm’s affairs among outside directors
and dependency on top managers for necessary information are some other possible
explanations for the insignificant contribution of board structure (Cheung and Chan,
2004; La Porta et al., 1998; Thillainathan, 1991). However, our result, to some extent,
supports the free cash flow agency theory, which states that when available cash is
controlled by managers, governance practices have a vital role to play in mitigating the
conflict between shareholders and managers concerning this cash.
Several limitations of this study have revealed the path for further investigations.
First, due to the scarcity of data, this study depends on a pooled model for a two-year
period (i.e. 2008 and 2009) to measure earnings predictability. A longitudinal study can
provide insight into the predictive ability of earnings numbers, so perhaps using longer
time-series observations to measure earnings predictability could yield better results.
Second, this study did not address the endogeneity issue in relation to board and
ownership structure. It is evident that the characteristics of board and ownership
structure are not necessarily independent of earnings quality, and it would not be
unusual that firms with higher earnings quality would be more likely to have a strong
board structure and effective ownership structure (Engle, 2005). Beyond the scope of
this study, there may be other factors such as capital requirements, political process,
tax and non-tax regulation as suggested by Dechow et al. (2010) that influence earnings
predictability. Finally, because contexts differ, the findings of this study may not be
applicable to other settings such as those that have high investor protection, less
family ownership, less concentrated ownership and no pyramidal ownership. This is
because governance mechanisms are expected to play different roles in firms in
developing countries, where the conflict of interest is not the same as that in firms
in developed countries.
Notes
1. The terms “SFCF” and “free cash flow agency problem” are used interchangeably in this
study because both of them refer to the existence of high free cash flow but low growth
opportunities. Moreover, the authors use the term SFCF for free cash flow in low growth
firms to ease exposition, as suggested by Chung et al. (2005).
2. The five main institutional investors are employee provident fund (EPF), Lembaga Tabung
Angkatan Tentera (LTAT), Lembaga Tabung Haji (LTH), Social Security Organisation






































3. To see how the heteroskedasticity-corrected least square is performed, please refer to Aktas
and Oncu (2006, p. 81).
4. The remaining results tables are available from the author upon request.
5. Extant indices, such as Gompers’ index or Brown and Gayor’s index, are not suitable for the
Malaysian market because they are based mainly on provisions relating to takeover defenses
and restrictions in shareholders’ rights. Hostile takeovers are rare in the Malaysian market
due to concentrated ownership and unique institutional settings.
References
Ahmed, K. and Ali, M.J. (2013), “Determinants and usefulness of analysts’ cash flow forecasts:
evidence from Australia”, International Journal of Accounting and Information
Management, Vol. 21 No. 1, pp. 4-21.
Aktas, H. and Oncu, S. (2006), “The stock market reaction to extreme events: the evidence from
Turkey”, International Research Journal of Finance and Economics, Vol. 6, pp. 78-85.
Atwood, T., Drake, M.S. and Myers, L.A. (2010), “Book-tax conformity, earnings persistence and
the association between earnings and future cash flows”, Journal of Accounting and
Economics, Vol. 50 No. 1, pp. 111-125.
Bradbury, M., Mak, Y.T. and Tan, S. (2006), “Board characteristics, audit committee
characteristics and abnormal accruals”, Pacific Accounting Review, Vol. 18 No. 2, pp. 47-68.
Bruch, T.H., Bromiley, P. and Hendrickx, M. (2000), “The free cash flow hypothesis for sales
growth and firm performance”, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 21 No. 4, pp. 455-472.
Bukit, R.B. and Iskandar, T.M. (2009), “Surplus free cash flow, earnings management and audit
committee”, International Journal of Economics andManagement, Vol. 3 No. 1, pp. 204-223.
Chen, Y. and Rezaee, Z. (2012), “The role of corporate governance in convergence with IFRS:
evidence from China”, International Journal of Accounting and Information Management,
Vol. 20 No. 2, pp. 171-188.
Chen, Y.R. and Chuang, W.T. (2009), “Alignment or entrenchment? Corporate governance
and cash holdings in growing firms”, Journal of Business Research, Vol. 62 No. 11,
pp. 1200-1206.
Cheng, C.S.A., Johnston, J. and Liu, C.Z. (2013), “The supplemental role of operating cash flows
in explaining share returns”, International Journal of Accounting and Information
Management, Vol. 21 No. 1, pp. 53-71.
Cheung, S.Y.L. and Chan, B.Y. (2004), “Corporate governance in Asia”, Asia Pacific Development
Journal, Vol. 11 No. 2, pp. 1-32.
Chi, J.D. and Lee, S.D. (2010), “The conditional nature of the value of corporate governance”,
Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol. 34 No. 2, pp. 350-361.
Chung, R., Firth, M. and Kim, J.B. (2005), “Earnings management, surplus free cash flow, and
external monitoring”, Journal of Business Research, Vol. 58 No. 6, pp. 766-776.
Claessens, S. and Fan, J.P.H. (2002), “Corporate governance in Asia: a survey”, International
Review of Finance, Vol. 3 No. 2, pp. 71-103.
Connelly, T.J., Limpaphayom, P. and Nagarajan, N.J. (2012), “Form versus substance: the effect
of ownership structure and corporate governance on firm value in Thailand”, Journal of
Banking & Finance, Vol. 36, pp. 1722-1743.
Dechow, P., Ge, W. and Schrand, C. (2010), “Understanding earnings quality: a review of the
proxies, their determinants and their consequences”, Journal of Accounting and







































Dittmar, A. and Mahrt-Smith, J. (2007), “Corporate governance and the value of cash holdings”,
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 83 No. 3, pp. 599-634.
Engle, E. (2005), “Discussion of does the market value financial expertise on audit committees of
boards of directors?”, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 43 No. 2, pp. 195-204.
Fama, E.F. and Jensen, M.C. (1983), “Separation of ownership and control”, Journal of Law
& Economics, Vol. 26, pp. 301-325.
Gul, F.A. (2001), “Free cash flow, debt-monitoring and managers’ LIFO/FIFO policy choice”,
Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 7 No. 4, pp. 475-492.
Gul, F.A. and Tsui, J.S.L. (2001), “Free cash flow, debt monitoring, and audit pricing: further
evidence on the role of director equity ownership”, Auditing, Vol. 20 No. 2, pp. 71-84.
Harford, J., Mansi, S.A. and Maxwell, W.F. (2008), “Corporate governance and firm cash holdings
in the US”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 87 No. 3, pp. 535-555.
Hussainey, K. (2009), “The impact of audit quality on earnings predictability”, Managerial
Auditing Journal, Vol. 24 No. 4, pp. 340-351.
Ismail, W.A.W., Dunstan, K.L. and Van Zijl, T. (2009), “Earnings quality and corporate
governance following the implementation of Malaysian code of corporate governance”,
Working Paper No. 28/2010, available at: http//ssrn.com/abstract¼1543524 (accessed
February 2, 2013).
Jaggi, B. and Gul, F.A. (1999), “An analysis of joint effects of investment opportunity set, free
cash flows and size on corporate debt policy”, Review of Quantitative Finance and
Accounting, Vol. 12 No. 4, pp. 371-381.
Jensen, M.C. (1986), “Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers”,
The American Economic Review, Vol. 76 No. 2, pp. 323-329.
Jensen, M.C. and Meckling, W.H. (1976), “Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs
and ownership structure”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3 No. 4, pp. 305-360.
Kusnadi, Y. (2011), “Do corporate governance mechanisms matter for cash holdings and firm
value?”, Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Vol. 19, pp. 554-570.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. (1998), “Law and finance”,
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 106 No. 6, pp. 1113-1155.
Lasfer, M.A. (2002), “Board structure and agency costs”, Working Paper No. 30/2002, available at:
http://ssrn.com/abstract¼314619 (accessed February 10, 2013).
Lee, K.W. and Lee, C.F. (2009), “Cash holdings, corporate governance structure and firm
valuation”, Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies, Vol. 12 No. 3,
pp. 475-508.
Nohel, T. and Tarhan, V. (1998), “Share repurchases and firm performance: new evidence on the
agency costs of free cash flow”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 49 No. 2, pp. 187-222.
Officer, M.S. (2011), “Overinvestment, corporate governance, and dividend initiations”, Journal of
Corporate Finance, Vol. 17 No. 3, pp. 710-724.
Oswald, D. and Young, S. (2008), “Share reacquisitions, surplus cash, and agency problems”,
Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol. 32 No. 5, pp. 795-806.
Pawlina, G. and Renneboog, L. (2005), “Is investment cash flow sensitivity caused by agency
costs or asymmetric information? Evidence from the UK”, European Financial
Management, Vol. 11 No. 4, pp. 483-513.
Rahman, A.F. and Mohd-Saleh, N. (2008), “The effect of free cash flow agency problem on the
value relevance of earnings and book value”, Journal of Financial Reporting and






































Richardson, S. (2006), “Over-investment of free cash flow”, Review of Accounting Studies, Vol. 11
No. 2, pp. 159-189.
Securities Commission (2007), Revised Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance, available at:
www.micg.net/brochure/eg2007 (accessed March 3, 2013).
Siagian, F.T. and Tresnaningsih, E. (2011), “The impact of independent directors and
independent audit committees on earnings quality reported by Indonesian firms”, Asian
Review of Accounting, Vol. 19 No. 3, pp. 192-207.
Sweeney, A.P. (1994), “Debt-covenant violation and managers’ accounting responses”, Journal of
Accounting and Economics, Vol. 17 No. 3, pp. 281-308.
Thillainathan, R. (1991), “Corporate governance and restructuring in Malaysia: a review of
markets, mechanisms, agents and the legal infrastructure”, paper prepared for the Joint
World and OECD Survey of Corporate Governance, available at: www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
7/24/1931380.pdf (accessed April 3, 2013).
Velury, U. and Jenkins, D.S. (2006), “Institutional ownership and the quality of earnings”, Journal
of Business Research, Vol. 59 No. 9, pp. 1043-1051.
Vogt, S.C. (1994), “The cash flow/investment relationship: evidence from US manufacturing
firms”, Financial Management, Vol. 23 No. 2, pp. 3-20.
Watts, R.L. and Zimmerman, J.L. (1978), “Towards a positive theory of the determination of
accounting standards”, Accounting Review, Vol. 53 No. 1, pp. 112-134.
Wu, L. (2004), “The impact of ownership structure on debt financing of Japanese firms with the
agency cost of free cash flow”, EFAMA 2004 Basel Meetings Paper, available at: http://
ssrn.com/abstract¼488042 (accessed March 3, 2013).
Ye, K., Zhang, R. and Rezaee, Z. (2010), “Does top executive gender diversity affect earnings
quality? A large sample analysis of Chinese listed firms”, Advances in Accounting,
Incorporating Advances in International Accounting, Vol. 26 No. 1, pp. 47-54.
About the authors
Redhwan Ahmed AL-Dhamari, academic qualification: Master in financial accounting, Tehran
University, Iran. Current position: a PhD candidate, College of Business, Universiti Utara
Malaysia, Malaysia. Areas of expertise: financial accounting and reporting.
Redhwan Ahmed AL-Dhamari is the corresponding author and can be contacted at:
redwandamari@yahoo.com
Ku Nor Izah Ku Ismail, academic qualification: PhD, accounting, University of Wales, Cardiff;
MBA Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia; BSc accounting, Western Kentucky University; Diploma in
social science research methods, University of Wales, Cardiff. Current position: Professor at






To purchase reprints of this article please e-mail: reprints@emeraldinsight.com



































This article has been cited by:
1. Xu_Dong Ji, Kamran Ahmed, Wei Lu. 2015. The impact of corporate governance and ownership structure
reforms on earnings quality in China. International Journal of Accounting & Information Management 23:2,
169-198. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 U
ni
ve
rs
iti
 U
ta
ra
 M
al
ay
si
a 
A
t 0
1:
37
 0
9 
Ju
ne
 2
01
5 
(P
T
)
